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The behavioral sciences in conjunction with history provide a
unique opportunity for a more creative , yet precise , approach to the
‘

role of man as an historical and social agent.

On the one hand his-

tory provides an approach to man ’ s role based on the appeal to both
facts and creative interpretation.

On the other , the behavioral sci-

ences can provide historians with a more precise concept of the mechanism of social , cultural , and personal role development and action.
The creative conjunction of the behavioral sciences and history is
called Neo-synthecism in order to more easily identify this approach.
There are two purposes to this essay:

to show both the general utility :

of a behavioral approach to history , and.the specific role. of the selffulfilling prophecy.

The self-fulfilling prophecy , derived from the work of sociologist , Robert K. Merton , demonstrates how men tend actively to fulfill
and objectify the expectations they hold for themselves.

Thus men at-

tempt both consciously and unconsciously to f4lfill their own prophecies.
The data upon which this approach is based is primarily of an
interpretive nature.

It briefly explores how individual scholars have

impl icitly assumed the idea of the self-fulfilling prophecy in the
,

course of their writing.

Most historians unconsciously utilize the

concept without identifying or recognizing it as a specific behavioral
function of men , and their activities , in general.

Further , the essay

invest.igates the idea of national character and social myth as factors
which the self-fulfilling prophecy both contributes to and is dependent upon.
Neo-synthecism , while not a total explanation of the ’'why" of
history does help to account for

som~

of its "mysteries."

It can ,

for instance , through the behavioral approach , help to explain the
role of the irrational as a causative historical factor.

It also

helps to explain the mechanisms which prompt men to revolutionary
action.

Thus it can penetrate the background of historical events

more fully.

At the same time it provides the historian with a new

instrument for understanding the future as well as the past.

That

is , in eχplaining one of the mechanisms whereby men control and modify events to suit their own beliefs , it enables historians to understandwhy particular expectations can or cannot be fulfilled.

In

one sense then the historian looks back from the "future" into the
past and predicts the predominance of one historical event over another.

Neo-synthecism , however , is a theory based upon suspended judgment.

It holds its interpretation in abeyance of the future

dict and is instructed

b퍼

’

B

ver-

events.
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CHAPTER I

{

INTRODUCTION
History can be made. It is not
necessary to receive it as mere
destiny.
Gunn~r Myrdal
We live ••• lives based upon selected fictions. Our view of
reality is conditioned by our
position in space and time-not
by our personalities as we like
to think.
Lawrence Durrell
Ideas , not unlike good wines , need time not necessarily to mellow , but at least to age.

The ideas presented herein may be "under-

aged" (or perhaps may have even
。r

II

gone sour ll !) but are no less important

deserving of attention or elaboration.

While my particular approach

may.not bring to the subject the necessary intelligence of explication
and elaboration (this judgment I leave to the reader) something must be
said of these ideas to at least clear the field for future work.
My intention in this essay is to promote , in some small way , the
inter-utility of the behavioralrsciences with history and vice-versa.
In doing so ,

however ，~

do not propose to once again lead history

uncritical worship at the altars of science.

t。

George' Gaylord Simpson

has said that:
The present'chaotic stage of humanity is not , as some wishfully maintain , caused by lack of faith but by· too much unreasoning faith within these boundaries where such faith should have
no place. J.

-

~'.:'-"2 1.~.::.:;...; ‘’
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It is in the

n없ne

of just such an attempt (i.e. the elimination

of unreasoning faith) that contemporary scholars have made giant
strides in the name of reason (or at least rationality).
what many , butby

n~

Unfortunately ,

means all , have been guilty of is a kind of "un-

reasoned faith" in reason itself.

The effect is ultimately not unlike

being one of the faithful of the religious variety.

Both sometimes

forget that the basis of their respective views of reality rely on an
equally tenuous foundation of assumptions and pre-suppositions.

Spe-

cifically , what "rational man" often neglects in his attempts at ’'definition" is that corollary toreason in every man which is
"irrational".

the

It is , -in one sense , the concern of this essay to elab-

orate on just what the
ical process.

낀 aIled

el양nent

of the irrational has to do with histor-

But in another and deeper sense it is also to show the

relationship that exists both inadvertently and consciously

bet찌een

historical process and man ’ s ability to in some way shape his future.
At base what this means is that man is ultimately responsible with regard to the individual and to the outcome of his society at large.

It

must be stressed , therefore , that this essay is not an "end" in any
sense of the word.

Qnone level it is a statement of purpose; on

another it is a statement of future intent.
Hopefully the behavioral sciences , and specifically sociology
and psychology , will offer a direction to the study of man that seems
for the most part unexamined.

And while I have let the behavioral

sciences direct , I have not let them lead.
rally removed in the occasion of its

’‘

History , being " ••• tempo2 cannot be dictated to.

even~~I-

Interpretation is , however , a different matter , and as I tend to think

3

in terms of the historian , I have chosen my direction of interpretation
Let it not be.disparaging of , or to , the behavioral

accordingly.
scientist.

Each of us must choose.

In the following essay ,

~

will be concerned not so much with his-

torical sequence as I will. be with the nature of particular interpretations and their relative importance to my thesis.

In the same manner

I will be less concerned with events than with what men have thought
뾰믿효

those events.

’

For it is not the intelligent understanding of our

past , in order to control the future , that must be the historian ’ s primary concern.

More importantly it is with the knowledge of man's ca-

pacity , both to control and be controlled , tobe at once agent and
objective observer , and to realize that he can never step "outside" of
history ’ s ebb and flow.

Ultimately this must be his foremost consid-

eration.
Because this essay is primarily concerned with the mechanism and
implications of the objectification of an historical and pehavioral
process , and not simply with facts per se , there is .not a concentration
。r

emphasis on primary research.

The very nature of the problem lends

itself more fully to interpretation and a certain amount of necessary
speculation.

One must also know the problem before he can solve it.
r

~

CHAPTER II
THE VIEW
Tw entieth

THE FUTURE

Century historians are perhaps the strangest breed of

scholars ever produced.
making.

]’ROM

They are caught in a dilemma of their own

For while it is fashionable to decry causation in history ,

all appear to be looking for meaning; and meaning is , after all. only
another word for the product of causal relationships.

Certainly few

historians will admit to anything more than relating:

"wie es eigent-

lich gewesen."

But , while it may be in bad taste to raise the question

of causation in history , the "need" to find'meaning , to explain the
"why" of 'a particular event , remains as relevant as ever.
and defecation , causality is rarely spoken of directly.

Like death
I will not

only discuss and propose a theory of both direct and indirect causality in history , but also examine

and 、·illustrate

how other scholars ,

not only historians , have often unwittingly and/or without full awareness of the forces involved , implicitly affirmed the existence of a
particular and verifiable historical theory.
This

approa~h

will hopefully be more than cursory and less than
r

comprehensive.

It will , in the end , set the stage for a wider and

more embracing approach to the social sciences.through a broader understanding of a little known and little understood phenomenon derived
from the work of the sociologist Robert K. Merton.

This phenomenon is

’.1 and it is to this we must first direct
the "self-fulfilling prophecy"our attention.

The "Thomas Theorem"
and
the Self-fulfilling Prophecy
Robert K. Merton , in his book Social Theory and Social Structure
raises , almost indirectly , a theory of social causation which in its
consequences extends far beyond the somewhat minor position that he
relegates it to.

Taking the Thomas theorem {"If men define situations

2
as real , they are real in'their consequences") .... as his basis , Merton
eχpands

the theorem into a definition of broad social action and reac-

Merton points out , with regard to the Thomas theorem , that it:

tion.

••• provides an unceasing reminder that men respond not only t。
the objective features of a situation , but also , and at times
primarily , to the meaning this situation has for them. And
once they have assigned some meaning to the situation their
consequent behavior and some of the consequ~nces of that behavior are determined by the ascribed mea~ini.3
How then does this apply to "real" situations?
,

trates the mechanism in a

’Sociological

4
Parablell11 .""

Merton illusHe describes a

hypothetical banking failure and collapse in the early Thirties which
was due to an objectification of eXRectations.

In the case of Merton ’ g

"Last National Bank" example , the rumored insolvency of the bank becomes real insolvency when enough people believe the rumor to be true
and attempt to salvage their earnings.

Merton explains the failure

thusly:
The stable financial structure of the bank had depended upon one
set of definitions of the situation: belief in the validity of
the interlocking system of economic promises men live by. Once
depositors had defined the situation otherwise , once they questioned the possibility of having these promises fulfill홈 d ， the
consequences of this unreal situation were real enough.
J

Merton goes on for nearly all of the remaining portion of his chapter
to expose the elemtns of the Thomas theorem as it

~pplies

to the

6

racial problem

This latter example , important as it may

~n America.
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What Merton says

·때

be , need not overly concern us at this juncture.

,‘ ’t
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•‘ .n e

important matter.
By way of further example let us "read out" the mechanism on a
more individual level , for ultimately it is individual action which
provides the "stuff of history."
a so-called

Let us assume that someone visits

'’ fortune teller" and that during the

‘ course、

of the evening

the "seer" makes a prediction concerning events that are to transpire
on the following day , and that among those events the "seer' ’ foretells
‘

。f

an accident which is to take place in that person ’ s living room on

the next morning.

In most instances the individual will shrug off this"

prediction as humorous , but irrelevant , fantasy.

In this case , however ,

the next morning , while nailing a picture to the wall , the individual
falls off the stool he was on thus fulfilling the "fortune teller ’ s It
prophecy , albeit perhaps subconsciously.
self-fulfilling prophecy is , in

As Merton points out:

the 、‘ beginning，

a

로략똥

"The

definition of

the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false
6
conception come 호프프트."- Thus , in our example , despite the individual's
scoffing at the seer ’ s prediction as false , it has none-the-less evoked
a new series of behavioral reactions which have caused the essentially
false prediction to "come true.":

that is to say , the individual in-

sures and produces hisown accident.
such behavior , to say that:

Merton continues , concerning

"The specious validity of the self-fulfill-

ing prophecy perpetuates a reign of

빼error.

For the prophet will cite

the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very
beginning. _t 7

7

But need the validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy be specious
in all circumstances?

Or , are there , after all , circumstances in which

the self-fulfilling prophecy leads to situations that are valid in themselves with regard to the predictions made aBout them?

Can a people , a

nation , or an entire civilization guide the course of its own destiny
over the entire range of"possible futures?

These questions form the

framework of what is to follow and act as arrows pointing in new directions of investigation.

What then can we say of these questions?

r

CHAPTER III
PATTERNS
I have chosen to call' the objectification of the self-fulfilling
prophecy in history "Neo-synthecism."

My purpose in referring to the

objectification of the self-fulfilling prophecy as "snyth랴 ic" is to
present the role of the behavioral sciences (e.g. psychology and
sociology) in a union with historical method.
Thus , the theory presented l1 ere is "synthetic" in that it is a
partial synthesis of those several disciplines.

The prefix "Neo-"

has been affixed in order to avoid (hopefully) any connotation of
the Hegelian "dialetic":

that is , to prevent the mistake of view-

ing this theory as a synthesis derived from a "thesis" and an "antithesis"; also , simply because it is a "new" theory of social and
cultural causation.
Neo-synthecism is a theory of history based upon suspended judgment.

Because the art and science of written history

depends~

no matter

what the nature of causation may be , upon interpretation and creativity ,
as well as upon documentation and the appeal to facts , Neo-synthecism ,
as every true history must , holds its truths in abeyance of the future ’ g
interpretive

verdict~

Whereas a total theory of history would attempt to perhaps "read"
from the future , as well as fram the past , the Neo-synthetic theory
makes no pretentions to that effect. 'With the contemporary state of

--.-.-----

9
i~ ，

the' art being what it
,

such an attempt would likely be futile.

As

the role of the historian broadens , however , such endeavors may even-

‘
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With computer aids , the several

tually prove modestly successful.
--en • a m e ” e -- ·n•‘
er

tory" , and most importantly , an identification of the role of the
self-fulfilling prophecy , certain future historical trends could be
more effectively charted than ispresently possible.
The question of future trends should at least be raised here , if
(This problem will be dealt with , at least partially ,

not answered.

in the final section.)

What this attempt becomes , therefore , is one

of exploration of the currents of historical process themselves.
,

While

not disregarding whatever "ends" history holds , neither does it become
bound by them.

Stated simply , Neo-synthecism is a theory of ongoing

process and not of'final or teleological ends.
Studies in the Self-fulfilling Prophecy
As has been noted , Neo-synthecism is a theory based upon suspended
judgment.

It is still , however , a gauge for social and cultural ambi-

tions , hopes , and fears.

Until the Renaissance , the idea of progress

had been of relatively minor importance.

The 16th and 17th centuries

mark for the first time in human history the explicit idea of earthly
,

pr。gresg .l

r

It is aIso in the 17th cent1lry that the idea of

”rev。1u-

2
tion" in the political sense was derived.- Revolution hinges on the

idea of progress.

For without the hope of human betterment , there

could be no projection of the aspirations of worldly political , social ,
and cultural improvement.

. -.

一--~

~γ7

The concept of revolution is , in' fact , an

10
explicit recognition of the idea that a man's thoughts and ideals must
lie in the future to be relevant to the present.
Spanish philosopher has{said that ,

” Every。ne

Miguel Unamuno , the

who fights

f。r

any ideal

whatever , although his ideal may seem to lie‘ in the past , is driving
the world on to the future. ".3
,,

·J

This generation of ideals , their pro-

jection , or "drive to the future ," is the concretization of the· selffulfilling prophecy.
cept.

Thus , every true revolutionary utilizes the con-

While it is tempting to investigate the very obvious connections

with Marxist revolutionary thought , I will touch only peripherally
upon the subject·as I primarily wish to concentrate on American history.

(See appendix.)
Most instances of the self-fulfilling prophecy in history and

in historical interpretation occur.in such'a manner as to be almost
invisible , due to the obviousness of their operation.

Th e Am erican

revolution , for instance , can be seen as a reaction , in terms of an
economic and socio-ideological outlook , in which the vision of the
future modified and directed the outcome.

The colonials , prior to

the early middle 1760 ’ s , for example , looked upon themselves:almost
exclusively as part and parcel of the British Empire.

Expectations

reflected in colonial literature prior to 1763 would seem to indicate
that Americans considered themselves British in the full sense of the
word. 4

The end of the French and Indian wars in 1763 and the resump-

tion of Great Britain's attempt to reimpose its full supremacy over
the colonies , modified colonial attitudes to the extent that the
mother country became the symbol of repression rather than of tolerance and order.

A case can certainly be madefor the assumption that

11
most colonials

eχpected，

at least until the mid-seventies , that America

would remain in , and contribute to , Britain ’ s "course of Empire."
deed , it

w。 uld

seem thatlmany

col。niaIs

In-

believed that America was only

However , when the full extent of British economic

Britain outre-mer.

and political attitudes became known (or rather felt!) the colonials
began to modify .their views of the future.

The seeds of the Constitu-

tion of 1787 were thus , in no small degree , sown in 1763.

따1-

In its

phases on the written assurance of such things as no bills of attainder ,
no ex post

fact。

legislation and the guarantee of habeas corpus , the

constitution would be the embodiment of the break from England.

No

longer would Americans look upon Britain as mentor , but as suppressor.
Events which shaped and directed Colonial resistance , such as
,

the Boston Massacre were , in and of themselves , a reaction.which constituted what the colonists· wished the situation to be , rather than
what was actually the case.

The grievances listed by Thomas Jefferson

in the Declaration of Independence , and directed against George III ,
in their intellectually emotional and almost literary. style are not ,
in a strict sense , real appeals to wrongs committed against the co-

10따a1s.5 More properly they are ” projected ” wrongs and affr。ntS 뿔
seen by the colonials.

Whether George III , for instance , could in

reality be accused (as Jefferson did) ofi.having as his" ••• direct obr

ject the establishment of an absLlute tyranny

。ver i헐er펠7

.,, 6 is

certainly moot.
Whether

on앙

,
/

regards the Revolution as an economic phenomenon

or as an intellectual movement based upon "natural law ,’I the fact
remains that without a projection of possibilities into the future ,

12
，~ithout

some very real expectations as to what the future was to be

made to hold , and without a prophetic sense (or , if you will , mission)
the revolution could not have taken place.

John Adams argued , for ex-

ample , that:
The prospect now before us in America , ought ••• to engage the
attention of every man of learning , to matters of power and
right , that we may beneither led nor driven blindfolded to
irretrievable destruction. Nothing less than this seems to
have been meditated for us , by somebody or other in Great
Britain. There see~ to be a_direct and formal design on
foot , to enslave all America. 7
Thomas Paine also reflected this same sense of the future.

Con-

sider the following:

"It is repugnant to reason , to the universal or-

der of things , to all

ex없~les

from former ages , to suppose , that this

continent can' longer remain subject to any external power. 8
Here is the writ ing of a man who not only has a "prophetic" sense
,

。f

history , but iS'resolved that his view shall come to pass.
Once the

co~itment

had been made to the basic cause of independ-

ence , the range of future horizons could be broadened widely:

the

Constitution and the Bill of Rights are the tangible results of that
extended horizon.

These two fQrmative documents are ostensibly based

upon principles of liberty andequality for all men.

The preamble ,

for example , speaks in terms of ''We the People ••• ," implying an extension of freedom to more than just a single cross-section of the population.

The Bill of Rights too mentions specifically (Articles I , II ,

and IV). "The right of the poeple"; not simply a specific social or
political group , but again

” the pe。ple” ·9

In one sense , however , the abolitionist movement , the Civil War ,
the integration movements from Little Rock to the present , and the

...,.a..

13
Civil Rights Acts of the 1960 ’ s , are all att윈npts to fulfill the·essential quality of prophecy embodied in the Constitution and Bill of
Rights.
I

In 1943 , Gunnar Myrdal , in his classic 6tudy An American Dilemma
noted the prophetic and unfulfilled ideals of these two basic American
doctnnents.

Myrdal pointed to what he called "the American Creed" (i.e.

of the Constitution and Bill of Rights) and noted that as an ideal of
social , political , and moral conduct , white (and black)

、Americans

held

a.set of values which professed equality , but promoted a fairly rigid
state of inequality.

Myrdal

,

in an unfortunately abbreviated manner

,

offered , as a solution to the racial problem , an intensification of
the American Creed.

The study showed quite clearly that the conditions

of 'our Constitution and Bill of Rights were.unfulfilled.
There is , of

cours양’

10

the obvious criticism to this line of rea-

soning that the. founding fathers were both speaking and writing rhetorically.
th~

The argument states that the authors of the Constitution and

Bill of Rights had no real intention of ever extending the freedoms

enumerated in these documents to large sections of the population , especially the black slave and non-property holding poor white.

In ef-

feet the "natural law" which was deemed universal was so only to a
fair1y small , propertied , whitF male cross section

。f

hmanity.

Uni-

versal "self-evident" truths , which men such as Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison espoused , were to be limited , inreality , to a select
"quasi-aristocracy" and middling class.

Thus the proponents of this

line of reasoning would point to the electoral.college as an
。f

what the founding fathers truly had in mind.

ex없nple

In this regard

,

the

14
argument continues , they were motivated not by the extension of liberty to all men , or even to all Americans , but rather by "enlightened selfThis 'position has much to reconunend it , and may come close

interest."

to the truth of the matter.

The validity of the argument is , however ,

relatively unimportant with regard to the considerations being studied
The important thing·to note is the effect that the rhetoric , true

here.
。r

false , has had upon the American imagination.
If the founding fathers had no intention of extending liberty to

효표

men , certainly succeeding generations of Americans at least have

begun to do so.

In part , the middle-class quest for security has prompted

the fulfillment of the prophecy of the rhetoric of the Constitution and
Bill of Rights.

Impelled by fear of minority violence , which also rep-

resents a challenge to middle class supremacy , the middle-class has sought
to extend the dominance of their position by incorporating other minorities
into the political , economic , and social infrastructure they have built.
The effort has thus been to submerge minority groups and dissenters by
extending and projecting the rhetoric

ρf

freedom into reality.

Consti-

tutional rhetoric thus becomes a prophecy to be fulfilled , whether or
not it

"(V' 8S

originally intendedto be such.

The intriguing problem for the historian becomes one of affixing
a point in time when thig rhetOFic shifted into an attempt to live up
to the challenge of its implications.

One argument along these lines

suggests that the threat of Fascism and Communism have presented Americans with

8

need to live up to the challenge of American rhetoric.

11

Taken at face value this means only that certain conditions of
the American philosophy need to be intensified and promoted.

But the

15
language of the Preamble , which explains the general aims of the Constitution , exhibits an attitude of

,12

••• "our posterity ••• ’

'’mission.

1I

It points to the future , to

and explains what can be expected in the eχten-

sion of freedom to Americans under the protective aura of its enumerations.

It is a prescription for the future , a contract with destiny ,

the terms of which are now finally forcing Americans to account.

That

we have not lived up to the terms of our basic Republican documents is
obvious.

There has been , as noted above , a tradition of American liber-

alisrn which has recognized this all along.

It is this element in our

society which has frequently attempted to rectify the inequalities
generated by the traditionally individualistic white American.
cratic consent in America is an experiment unfulfilled.

Demo-

It has been ,

and remains , a picture of the future , a prediction which is based
upon the Constitution and Bill of Rights; its principles and methods
original1y formulated by men such as James Madison , and refined further
,

by Constitutional amendments over the last century and a half.

The

Constitution , a complex social charter which set up the political

없ld

legal limits of society , defended and promoted a particular view of
the future.

The Bill of Rights extended that view by insuring that

certain individual

없ld

social prerogatives would remain inviolate.

But the Revolution and

~ts

attendant view of the future are only

one aspect of the operation of Neo-synthecism.
only points in a direction:

The above discussion

it shows very basically how Neo-synthecism

can be used as a tool for interpretation and understanding of the past;
eventually we will come to see the possibilities for interpreting the
future as history.

Consideration must first be given tosome further

16

basic attributes of

~eo-synthecism.

Rightly or wrongly , intellectual historians tend to look upon
history as an act of cognitive involvement; one in which ideas tend
to prevail over mere activity.

Certainly this is at least in part

true.

Neo-synthecism is , to a great extent , the verification of this

idea.

On the one hand it accounts for human cognition in terms of di-

rected activity; on the other hand , it does not deny economic , psychosexual , religious (or whatever) theories of historical causation.

It

merely places them within the context of the self-fulfilling prophecy.
This , however , raises a pertinent question:

is the self-fulfilling

prophecy , in historical situations , only one aspect of a larger subject
and , if so , what may that subject be?

Or is it a larger subject in it-

self , of which other , hitherto unrelated "f ields-in-themselves" are
,

but a part?

That it should be introduced by the sociologist , Robert

Merton , is , in itself I think , significant.
of unconscious motivation it would seem
of the psychologist.
sociological context.

Yet we find

t~e

mαre

Considering the probability
properly within the realm

major , definitive work done in a

At this particular juncture I wish to .only raise

the point-- not explain it.

There is reason , however , to raise the

question of the psychologist ’ s involvement , as well as that of the
sociologist and historian , in (the

e1Florati。n 。 :E

this important but

neglected subject.
It seems almost inconceivable , on reflection , that human existence could be considered "in toto ’I without benefit of an adequate
understanding of the operation of the self-fulfilling prophecy.

Per-

haps the closest , and only , approach outside of Merton to the idea

17

Sartre ’ s "project ," for example ,

comes from Existential philosophy.

(i.e. conscious commitment to a course of action) probably touches
more than Sartre himself realized , in his discussions on psychology ,
the deepest elements of human culture and civilization. 13
Further the concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy is , in part ,
dependent on whether or not it is possible to determine a ’'national
character ," or at least leaders of a certain viewpoint.
Potter in his book People of Plenty raises and explores
。f

the American national character.

David M.
、'the

ques tion

At the same time Potter makes

some implicit assumptions concerning the self-fulfilling prophecy
which are helpful in understanding Neo-synthecism.
Potter points out that ,
and not a

fiχed

" ... national

character is a changing

quality , for culture itself.changes"; and culture ,

" ••• acting upon and shaping the personality ••• " is the determinant.

14

Potter derives th i. s conclusion from a study of the work of several
social psychologists , sociologists , and anthropologists.
how they have investigated the

natio~al

He describes

character , showing the rela-

tive rather than the absolute nature of character which is none-the15
less a real and , verifiable quality.
Derivation of national character , then , is a composite of many
different

approache~，

historical context.

all of

밴 ich

Potter attempts to unify

따 thin

an

But what is , the national American character?

Basically it is a commitment to a utilization of economic abundance.

16

,

As a result of this commitment many things make themselves apparent:
individualism , consumer orientation , and some of the persisting social
ills.

---.,...-

----.-<--，-~-←

Potter ’ s views concerning thenature of the American character

18

need not be our major concern here.

But it is important that Potter

feels it possible to definenationa1 character; that it is not a static
quality; and , finally , that he has come to grips with the problem in a
way which precludes any mystical qualifications.

But Potter ’ s reliance

is not on a simple subjective and unverifiable personal basis.

He qual-

ifies his observations in terms of the important work done along the
same lines in the behavioral sciences:
The behavioral sciences attach importance to the individual ’ s
image of himself , and the group ’ s image of itself , as forces
in the formation of character , for the individual or the group
will tend to be in fact what they imagine themselves to be in
fancy.17
Potter thus recognizes and attaches no little importance to this version
of the self-fulfilling prophecy.
implicit , if not at times explicit

Throughout his work there remains an
assumptio~

that men can shape their

future if they are aware of the nature of their goals.

Certainly ,

Potter has opened up the concept of national character to more critical
study.

Too , he provides us with some of the first valid studies of an

extremely difficult problem.
The

self-fu~filling

prophecy does not in an historical context ,

however , mean that only one view of the future isrequired or necessary;
in fact , often many prophecies may be made over an extended period of
time , and as the terms of one , or several , prophecies are fulfilled ,
others take their place.

Examples abound in American history.

For our

purposes , however , we will first examine , in limited detail , Albert K.
1

Weinberg ’ s Manifest Destiny , a study of nationalist expansionism in
Am erican history. 18

The philosophy of manifest destiny as Weinberg defines it is

19
" ••• the doctrine that one nation has a preeminent social worth , a distinctively lofty mission , and consequently unique rights in the applica,, 19

tion of moral principles. ’

’
Am erica ’ s

Weinberg s entire effort is directed at

t

showing hos this conception of

rol~

in the world has shaped

its attitudes toward itself as well as its neighbors.
Manifest destiny was in vogue long before the term itself met
with public approval , and was coined by John L. O'Sullivan in 1845 in
justification of the acquisition of the Oregon

20

territories.-~

Weinberg

describes in detail the many justificatory arguments used to promote
expansion , such as Natural Right , Geographical Pr edestination , the
Destined Use of the , Soil , Natural Growth , the Extension of Freedom ,
the White Man's Burden , the Mission of Regeneration , Political Gravitation , Inevitable Destiny , Paramount

Inter~st，

Political Affinity ,

Self Defense , International Police Power , and World Leadership.

He il-

lustrates graphically how the contents of manifest destiny have remained
consistently the same while the labels and rhetoric have shifted.

An

analysis of two of Weinberg ’ s chapteFs will suffice to show his method.

’

By the 1840 s manifest destiny had become a by-word in Am erican
life.

The idea of expansion over the limits of the entire continent

21

was widespread.--

The scope of expansion , however , was not as impor-

tant as the assumed superiority of American institutions. ·More than
anything the idea of freedom seemed to most Americans manifestly des,

tined to spread its benefits across the continent.

22

Weinberg dis-

cusses why the idea had not occurred (as one would assume it should
have) before this period.
did not initially seem

~_

..

---~

..

-

•

-

•

~‘

••

"'"'

Basically the acquisition of the territory

n~cessary.

Although , as Federalist paper

.,.,.,.

20

number nine points out , size assures a certain immunity to faction , the
area held in mind was only the original 13 states.

’'reason"

Another widely held

against expansion previous to the Forties was that it would

"endanger the rights 때 liberites of 현o관l ‘ir파vidual states"; and
23
individual citizens.-- Fear rather than altruism seems to have initially postponed expansion and prevented such consideration until these fears
were dissipated or allayed by the Thirties.

Democracy was at last seen
24
as fitting fully into the context of a large geographical area.
None

of these effects , however , reasons Weinberg , were enough to explain the
outburst of expansionism in the Forties.
a,

"... defensive
,, 25

er 1. ca. ’

",'1.- •• _

effort to forestall the encroachment of Europe in North
t

Thus "extension of the area of

answer to the extension
。n

The cause ultimately lay in

,:-:.......

:::-,I 'abso.1utism.

_.

0 택r .Europea.n

.-.-.-..

’ freedom ’

1 ... '1..._ ... 1..... .:

... _

1 ,,

was the defiant

26

1 "LQ

Weinberg goes

to point out that , significantly , although the United States feared

European encroachment , that encroachment was itself caused by a European fear of the growing political and economic power of the Americans.
This fear of growing American

power ，~

27

and the resulting "encroachment ,"

explains why the United States had not , previous to 1840 , been as concerned with the generation of absolutism from those quarters.
Three principle grounds are indicated by Weinberg for the American
fear of the European menace to her democracy.

First , the belief that

a direct threat to her security carried with it a direct threat
her political principles.

t。

Second , that European absolutism would

"pollute" Am erican democracy by its very contiguity.

An d third and

perhaps most influential , that adjacent European expansion would threat-

28

en the extension of American democracy........

The direct"menace" lay in

21

Texas and Oregon.

함as

The Un ion
,

now seen as imperiled by the failure

to annex Texas; too , expansion wasseen as a guarantee of states and
individuals ’ rights , and a guarantee against the centralization of
29
federal power.
Strangely , as Weinberg indicates , protection was

n。‘W

felt necessary , in certain quarters , against the their own Federal gov"
.30
ernment~~ ~
Added to these indications were the positive values of
individualism through a now espoused pioneering spirit.

Thus was born

an irresistible march of settlers who believed themselves' to be spreading the idea of freedom as they went.
31
become nationalized.
Am azingly

,

The propagation of freedom had

the fact that the Texas government was already Repub,

lican was either ignored or by-passed in arguments for annexation due
32

to the very nature of "nationalized American freedom."-- "Impatience"
,

with other men who did not understand the benefits of American freedom
33
moved Am ericans to exert an example by "pedagogical" methods.
It was
now put to the American pioneer to go into adjacent areas and spread
the idea of Am erican freedom by

direc~

word and action.

Once more , however , directions shifted and the peoples of other
non- American nations in our hemisphere , such as Mexico , Republican
though they may have been ,

~ere

seen as bearing the shackles of oppres-

sion and needful of the benefits of American freedom.

While this a1-

truism was at least partially felt , the emphasis lay actually on the
extension of freedom to

,

and for , basically white Americans only.

Weinberg comments that an incongruous belief had crept into the American philosophy of democracy:

~

" ••• the belief that , however equal men

..34
might be at birth , Americans had become subsequently a super-people."

22
And further , that:

" ••• the

’ Forties

witnessed the full flowering of

national self-esteem in consequence of the undeniable promise in Am erican life , of intensi~ie~ democratic self-co떠 ciousness， of heightened
nationalism , and of the partial stupidity of ‘ national adolescence. ’.35
The quality of moral ambition and a national

d。맑1a

。rdained

The Am erican concept was

mission were essentially combined.

of quasi-heavenly

a combination of "Calvinist pride and equalitarianism" which saw not
the meek , but the free inheriting the earth. 36
A second major area of concern for Weinberg is his chapter entitled "Political Gravitation" which moves from the quasi-moral and
ideological themes , of the ·Thirties and Forties into the quasiscientific and political motives of the Fifties , Sixties , and Seventies.
The new concept of expansion which captured the Am erican mind
was based on a notion of physics which sanctioned expansion as an
。 c~urrertce

derived out of the laws of the natural world of inanimate

objects and projected into the human political world.
elusion was

dr~wn，

1I • • •

Thus the con-

that adjacent nations within the range of Amer-

ica ’ s attraction would fall to the Union by a process as inevitable

37
a.s that causing the ripe apple to fall to earth. II - ·
doctrine carried with it
sentiment ••• "

38

m。잭

This curious

expectations and "more exalted moral

than any doctrine of expansion in American history.

Weinberg traces the genealogy of Newtonian physics from its application in the sphere of social behavior during the French and American
revolutions (where incidentally , in the latter case it was used as
a justificatory argument) , into international relations , the early

23

Canadian annexation schemes , and
middle and late 1850 ’ s.

do따1

to the Cuban "problem" of the

It was during the Cuban affair' that the term

"political gravitation" first Came into 찌ide American usage. 39
Why the concept came to fruition only after the Civil War , however , is probably due , as Weinberg comments , to:

" ••• the fertile soil

supplied in America itself'by the needs which unconsciously form the
‘

nationalist ’ s pragmatic criterion of .truth. ,, 40

This "fertile soil"

lay in the intense anti-imperialism of certain Republican、 Ie용ders ， due
41
itself in part to a certain war weariness.
Furthermore , idealism ,

, and strategic , political , and commercial inter-

emotional nationalism

ests , all "allied" in a somewhat shaky fashion to promote the idea of
"political gravitation".
coro~laries.

This "political Newtonianism1l had several

First , that an

1I • • •

ana1ysis of.many of the predictions

of the believers in political gravitation reveals ••• the explicit or
implicit assumption of a geographical

of

42

law'’.~-

Thus , adjacent islands

such as Cuba and the West Indies were seen as geographically destined
to "fall" into the waiting arms of Ame. rica.

This in turn was due to

the proximity of a large country to a small one.

Still another corol-

,, 43
lary was the "economico-political law of gravitation."-'-'"

Thu훌

econom-

ic considerations had found their way into the political sphere.
it was

reas 。ned ，

a comtry econ?micalIy dependent

up。n

For ,

anothar (as the

West Indies , Cuba , and Hawaii were seen to be upon the United States)
would be politically drawn into the former's political life.

This

theory , however , soon applied not only to islands , but also to any
44 Weinberg goes on to illustrate how the doccontiguous territory. <.H,

trine was used in justifying the acquisition of Alaska (a neat feat of

24

reasoning in itself , considering it was purchased by Secretary of State
Seward , and not taken by right!) and for the addition of other territories-

But , significantly , when

” apples ’·

such as the Dominican Repub-

lic and Denmark ’ s Carribean possessions were offered the United States ,
the"law" failed to operate.

Weinberg explains this anomaly by the

still fresh concern for the problems raised by the Civil War in the
late Sixties and ear.ly Seventies.

Ardent nationalists such as Senator

William M. Stewart and Representative Henry R. Gibson e xP lained this
condition by projecting the real test of the doctrine into the distant
45
future.·- Weinberg also attributes its lack of success to a mistaken
political assumption of the transferability by analogy. of "natural
law" into human events.

Thus two levels of phenomena were discussed

as if they were on one level.

Further , perhaps one of the most impor-

tant reasons for failure , outside of the simple fact of the expansionists being in the minority , was ,
’

ties towardthe greater."

For

I' • • •

the attitude of lesser nationali-

eχample，

the relationship between Spain

and its revolting Latin- American colonies , and to "El Colosso' ’ (the
.
_ 46
United States) to the North.·- Am ericans , strong in nationalism failed
to recognize the strength of nationalism in other peoples of other nations.

In contradiction to the implied policy of "non-action" that

underlay the theory of

politi~al

tO reveal a very active policy.
,

gravitation , certain incidents tended
Among the many direct actions , the

American interference in Dominican affairs during the Grand administra-

tion , marks the high1p。int of such activity.

The ultimate failure 。￡ the

non-interventionist annexation policy , characterized by political gravitation , lveinberg concludes , was due to:

" ••• the aggressive spirit of

25

manifest destiny itself. • • L표] disposed American ’ s very little to
that patient self-possession which was regarded by the stoics as the
true lesson of cosmic processes for men. ’.4 7
Now that we have seen , to some extent , Weinberg ’ s method in the
preceeding examples we must resolve the extent to which the Neo-synthetic theory is applied , and implied , in his study.
an

eχercise

In itself , the work is

in the process of the unfolding of the self-fulfilling proph-

ecy in American history.

Taking Weinberg ’ s definition of 、"manifest des-

tiny as a "jumping'off" point will help to illustrate some very basic
aspects of his implicit and unspoken assumption of the workings of the
self-fulfilling prophecy.
destiny was ,

"... the

Recalling that his definition o£ manifest

doctrine that one nation has a preeminent social

worth , a distinctively lofty mission ,

없ld

consequently unique rights

..48
in the application of moral principles; ’
it can be seen that there is

a philosophy , or concept , of nationhood which is defined in terms of
mission , purpose , and rights.
on two levels:

first , it is an

The implications of this definition lie
histo~ian’ s

concept of how a particular

people viewed themselves; second , it is not only a definition , but a
reality of outlook.

That is , it not only relates to an historian ’ s viev7

of a particular people , but also to their· own view of themselves.

In the

latter sense it is a definition ‘ concerning a society and its role with
regard to itself and its relation to the world around it.
to what extent can it be taken as a valid definition?

But exactly

Certainly , insofar

as we know at present , the Deity did not come to earth and voice to some
Am erican Moses his projected role for the future of this country.

It is

also evident that Americans perceived that they alone defined their social

~~.

.-• ...

‘-•
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worth.

Nor can it be said that any unique rights were given Am ericans

by God or world opinion.

The definitions of America ’ s role , her rights ,

destiny , mission , and social worth , were determined by her own citizens.
'~hatever

the method of argument utilized , the‘ fact remains that a de£ini-

tion of a problem , role , idea , or whatever , hinges on a prediction made
in conjunction with that definition.

The function of any such defini-

tion is thus to provide a basis of commitment to a concept of action. 49
In doing so , it is

뇨nportant

to note that the logic involved in

the fulfillment of a prophecy (which is what we shall see such a definition turn out to be) is not as important as the initial prediction
itself.

’

Weinberg s arguments , for example those concerning "objective

and subjective determinism ," implicitly make just such an assmnption
JV
concerning the role of the irrational. 50

In fact , the bases for his

entire study of manifest destiny are founded upon this groundwork.
Merton's concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy rests on the
idea that ,

뇨 i~ the beginning L표 펀 a 縮 definition of a situa-

tion evoking a new behavior which
come

ma~es

theoriginally false conception

.51 Manifest·destiny , as Weinberg has illustrated it , is a

프묘료."......

,

/→、

--'

reflection of Merton's

I

’false

definition" being made to come true.

Consider the separate views of the United States and Great Britain

’

’

with regard to each other in the 1830 s and 1840 s over the issues of
Texas and Oregon territories.

The expansionist·movements of

the]’。rties ，

Weinberg has shown , were generated by a growing fear of European encroachment

호n

North America , a fear of the "polluting" influences of

Old World absolutism.

On the other hand British encroachment was itself ,

Weinberg contends , caused by a similar fear by Britain of the growing

27

political and economic power of the United States.

What happened in

this case was that the definitions of political , economic , and military
motiveg generated

。n

each party ’ s respective side , evoked new behavior

on either ’ s part.This in turn justified and validated what was originally , at least in part , a farse belief , thereby evoking further , new
52
behavior.~Thus we see the perpetuation of Merton ’ s "reign of ter‘

_53

ror."

As Weinberg points out , there is often a
attribution and the reality of a cause.

difference、

between the

For instance there is the

problem of whether manifest destiny was directly "caused" by sectional
interest (e.g. slaveholders) or whether it found its raison d ’ etre in
54
an emotional idealism.
Therefore , it is necessary to distinguish
in all cases the necessary and the sufficient , and to determine what
may be considered "relevant cause" from what is an irrelevancy.
The grounds for American fear of European encroachment , in themselves , were not , in the full sense of the word , "real" threats.
er they were the expression of
case.

뼈erican

fears for what

으으묘화

Rath-

become the

Belief that a direct threat to security carried with it a direct

threat to political principles may have been well founded.

But we have

seen that the generation of fears on either side was due to a mutual
and reciprocating sense of suspicion.. There was , in other words , a
feedback effect in which an initial fear generated its opposite , which
again in turn reinforced the initial suspicion , and so on , ad infinitum.
Certain elements of this primary fear , however , broke away to form their
own manner of vicious circularity.

Fearof "political pollution' ’, and

the threatened curtailing of the extension of American democracy became

28

generators on their own behalf.

We see here a kind of double-sided ef-

feet of the basic Thomas theorem.

Whether or not the suspected fear of

Britain was true or not , American's defined the situation as real.
same was also true on Britain ’ s part.
uations.

Both became

emin~ntly

The

Both situations were defined sit-

real in their consequences.

There is ,

then , a point at which theattribution of a cause , and the reality of a
cause become enmeshed and inseparable.

Rhetoric , as a guage of section-

a1 interest , for instance was swept up in its own emotional verbage and
became , as in the case of Constitutional rhetoric , at once cause and
Prophecies generated out of fear , however , are not positive

effect.

pictures of the future.

They present a view of the failure which pro-

jects unhappy consequences and conditions.

We have seen how Weinberg

portrayed the dire consequences predicted by
。f
l

Texas.

~dvocating

the

They very structure and cohesiveness of the Union was seen

as imperiled by a failure to act in time on the Texas' issue.
a loss of individual
sizing doom.
doom?

anneχation

없ld

Fear over

states rights was another aid to those prophe-

But what is the real

me~ning

of this kind of prophecy of

Essentially , as a careful reading of Weinberg illustrates , such

predictions are antithetic images of the future , projected in the attempt
to realize a conscious , or·.unconscious , wished-for "true" image.

In-

stances abound of this negative form of the self-fulfilling prophecy.
It is , in fact , a fairly common form of 20th century "right" and "left"
wing political technique.

The John Birch Society , in its efforts to

"alert" the American people to the menace of internal Communist subversion , continually portrays a fut.ure America cowed by its enemies , its
ideals perverted , and its people enslaved and degraded.

All this effort

29

is , of course , not directed at fulfilling this prophecy , but at insuring.
its antithetic image.
The Left wirig (as well as in some cases the center political group55
ings) projects·a similar gloomy picture , but ‘from a different viewpoint.
It tends to view a future of fascist dehumanization with an attendant
loss of personal liberty.
S 휠ne:

In any case , the attempt is always much the

as in a photographic process a negative picture is projected in

order to insure a positive result.
If this line of reasoning is pursued the question will eventually
rise as to why anyone view of the future is able to predominate over
By what process , for example , did a national self-conscious-

another.

ness allow a doctrine such as political gravitation to be given societal
sanction?

Generally speaking , the self-fulfilling prophecy cannot contra-

diet basic values held by a particular society.

F’。r

instance , Represent-

ative William E. Robinson ’ s confidence , in believing that ,

"... the

time

..56
will come when Ireland will be annexed to this country ,"-.. . never came
In addition to the strategic dangers involved in Robinson ’ s

to pass.

statement , traditional American affinity for Britain may have precluded
any fulfillment of his prophecy.
Interpretation in terms of the Neo-synthetic theory depends on
the degree to which we are able , and

효훌프료료

that historians are in some

sense able , to evaluate and embrace the thought and spirit , that is the
climate of opinion of another age.

The applicability of this generali-

zation , indeed of any historical generalization , demands a certain faith.
'~einberg

assumes just such a faith in

te깐ns

of national character when

he discusses such subjects as "America ’ s consciousness of national des-

--.-'-

ι

-~→ -←=-.:::.....:...，:，..;.;.~특~
•.;::.;‘j;:::;;=-':"';~ ←→

30

•• 57

tiny"

~

and ,
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:the assumed superiority of American institutions."

There is of course the problem of the masses and leadership:

are indi-

viduals (presidents , senators , and other public officials) responsible
for national opinion; or are the voting

masses~

responsible1

Without

attempting to oversimplify a difficult question , the answer probably
lies somewhere in between.· For while national leaders are responsible
for foreign and domestic policy , public opinion may provide at least some
impetus to the formation of such policy.
。f

The relationship is likely one

a dual reciprocity , heavily weighted on the side of the "elected rep-

resenatives.". What we call the "state" in the Am erican sense , is supposedly a balance between authority and total liberty (i.e. , anarchy).
Weinberg and most American historians agree that the "state" is a viable
political entity which is responsible for

th~

decisions it makes.

Wein-

berg ’ s discussion of political gravitation is , as it rightly should be ,
almost entirely in terms of individual statesmen and the "state" itself.
While public attitudes may shape policy ,
theless advances through history by
the matter is this:

". . ..

~eans

the State. • .never,, 59

of decisions. ’

'"'-

._.

_~

The crux of

while the argument over who controls the state ,

the people or the politicians , may be unanswered , the state continues
to operate as a discreet unit.

Yet any decision the state may make is ,

in the final analysis , one embodying the essential quality of prophecy.
E’。r

decisions , such as those of Weinberg writes of with regard to mani-

fest destiny , are commitments based upon
tions.

expec~ed

(or unexpected) reac-

Certainly the conditions of some decisions cannot be fulfilled ,

as he illustrates in the case of 19th Century policy toward Latin America and the Carribean.
come true.

Men often make prophetic .statements which never

31
Before leaving Weinberg ’ s seminal study , it is necessary to discuss what he calls "the doctrine of inevitability. ,, 60

In his discussion

he comes very close to a reckoning with the self-fulfilling prophecy:
The general validity of the doctrine or inevitability is of
course a question independent of the accuracy of specific predictions. In raising this question of validity one can also leave
。 utside the discussion the ~road philosophical question of determinism itself. Determinism holds merely that the will lies within
the chain of causality • • • ·.Bu~ the expansionists went beyond determinism to a 모으프 sequiter. It is , as was shown by their predictions , the dogma that one can know the inevitable before it has
happened. This hmvever is the dogma of the metaphys'ician rather
than of the empirical scientist __ l편r underlinin 웰 Even predictions projecting the findings of 함융st observations must be of tentative character • • • • . for • • • the difficulty of prediction
is greater in the sphere of phenomena which are dependent upon
so great a variety of conditions as is the behavior of human
groups.6l
He thus concludes:

’'The

truth is that fundamental motives are too many ,

varied and conflicting to permit foreknowledge of the motive which will
..62

actuate the predominant
Taken at

~ace

group'~"

value this seems to be a somewhat telling argument

against Neo-s Yn thecismin general , for it
cl.imate of opinion.

see~

to deny knowledge of a

But is it?

In fact it is not:

for Weinberg was not aware in 1935 of several

factors which have since been derived from research in the behavioral
sciences.

I am of course speaking of both the Thomas theorem and Mer-

ton ’ s self-fulfilling prophecy.
long before Merton , he

c 따1e

But strangely , although he was writing

very close to identifying the mechanism

of the self-fulfilling prophecy when , quoting Allendy , he wrote:
‘

". .' .that once impressed upon the unconscious ,

’ 1 ’ image-destin'e

tend

activement경 sa r옳lisation’.，，63 The self-fulfilling prophecy despite
Weinberg ’ s contentions is not , however , a doctrine of inevitability.
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It is a behavioral concept which appears quite correct in .i ts assumptions.
To be a "doctrine of inevitability" Neo-synthecism , especially as
it concerns the self-fulfilling prophecy , would in part have to allow
that human events , if not dictated by reason , are at least interpreted
in its light.

That is , events would follow

_eallv

I'

。ne

upon the other.

In fact one of the traditional major historico-philosophical problems
64
derives itself from the very question of 츠!rationality.-· Hitler ’ s

"final solution to the Jewish Problem" can in no way , under present
moral canons , be considered rational in either the problem it poses or
its "solution."

Dachau , Auschwitz , and Belsen-Belsen can , in one way ,

Only that we must come to grips with the

pro~lem

of irrationality.

Neo-synthecism , while not directly explaining the reasons for the
irrational in man (this must be left to psychology) does very important1y provide for its direct expression.
of history , but rather an

As it is not a total explanation

exp1anation~of

a process in history , it can ,

unlike other theorles , accept the direct role of the irrational.

This

must not be construed in any way to meanthat irrationality is thereby
seen as a predominant historical force (although the possibility certainly exists!) .or that Neo-synthecism is based purely upon such an assumption.

The full import of this will be discussed in the final section.

Weinberg is aware of this problem of the irrational when he discusses
motive.

There is , however , a certain failure on his part , to recognize

the distinction between relating the future from the past , the past
from the present , and the future from the present , as they relate

t。
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historical interpretation.

This failure is indeed a crucial one.

Wein-

berg acts as if he has subsumed all three modes of interpretation under
。 ne

heading.

of events is , as Weinberg recognized ,

The'predicta꺼 ility

ultimately as difficult in the past as in the future.

Both the present

and the past present the historian with certain quite similar problems.
The past , as well as the future , consists of largely unrelated and undiscovered facts.

From our vantage point in time , we like to think
The' future , we

that both are vastly different modes of the occasion.
say is "unreadable" because it has not "arrived."

The future is either

continually moving towards us and/or we toward it.
。 ther

hand is said to have ceased to exist.

asι?void

The past on the

We tend to view the past

ofoption , while simultaneously considering the future preg-

nant with possibility.

The more "distant" the past the

it seems to become; the "nearer" the future the

믿으E료

궐똥

relevant

relevant.

While

Weinberg interprets various cross sections of American history as a
function of manifest destiny , he seems to deny the ability to derive
a prevailing climate of opinion.

The

、~xpansionists ，

_.65
beyond determinism to a non sequitur."--

predict the inevitable before it' happened ,
..66
predictions."""

he contends , ’vent

They assumed the ability
1I • • •

t。

as was shown by their

Putting aside the specifics of their predictions for

a moment , however , one fact is clear:

no matter what the particular

prediction made , the essential quality of their thought was expansion
and the extension of territory.

As certain different conditions came

to bear in each case , predictions were either fulfilled , as in the case
of Texas and Oregon , or passed

‘,

,

α 。blivion ，

as with Canada and Ireland.

Weinberg has stated that knowledge of the future , even from the vantage
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。f

the present looking into the past , must be of a "tentative character. 1I

Specifically , however , knowledge of the future , (or as Weinberg says ,
"the inevitable") is the , "dogma of themetaphysician. ’, 67
realize that if one

료cts

as if he knows the fpture , or the inevitable ,

he will likely att홉mpt to mak~ h~s view com훌 to P홉훌홉 •
try to fulfill his own prophecy.
being a

묘으므

He fails to

'l' hat

is , h 월 1셰 ill

Thus , despite the expansionist ’ s logic

sequitur it must have followed in their own minds.

Thus ,

too , they must have shared a "climate of opinion ," logical or not.

Al-

though the prediction of human behavior may be difficult , it does not ,
within limits , seem altogether impossible.

Weinberg implicitly accepts ,

as we have seen in the body of his writing , a certain unity and conformity of opinion.
meaningless.

If he did not , the concept of expansionism would be

His conclusion that "fundamental motives" are too varied

and conflicting to predict predominant actuating motives for differing
groups , seems , therefore , "too hard and fast in its judgment.
Futther , Weinberg writes concerning motive interpretation:
••• even ability to foretell the victorious motive would not overcome the difficulty offered by another fact... r·t is that the
same motive , in accordance with varying interpretations of an ~~
sue , impelled different individuals- in opposite directions ..•• 68
Yet , if his judgment is correct then his analysis of manifest destiny
is' only a variety of speculative history.

For the historian , from his

vantage point in the future , presumes to know at least some of the predominating motives of an event.
know neither the future
to agree to this.

n으!

If this is true , the historian can

the past; Weinberg would not , however , seem

For although the subject matter of history lies in

the past , the historian must ultimately realize that it can never exist
outside of the context of the present and the future.

CHAPTER IV
MYTH , HISTORY , AND THE :F’UI'URE
In discussing myth and history it must not be assumed that any
new data will be provided or derived as it relates directly to the concept of myth itself.

Myth as it is used here refers to ,

)’

an ill-

fO l;Ul ded belief held uncritically especially by an interested group." 1
In this context the definition becomes not simply a fanciful story of
past events and their relation to the formation of man and his world ,
but also , in the context ofNeo-synthecism , an explanation of why certain historical events come to pass.

Behind myth we will see , as this
‘

analysis progresses , its intimate connection with the self-fulfilling
prophecy.

The relationship betweenthe two provides a new tool for

understanding what has happened , and what is happening , in history.
In this regard Charles L. Sanford , in The Quest for ParadiseJ has not
neglected the import of myth as a causative factor in the unfolding of
history.

He says for instance , concerning the role of the myth of

the Garden of Eden , "It would be difficult to exaggerate the extent
1

to which such mythology has contributed to the dynamism of history. ’, 2
Sanford contends in fact , that the Christian Edenic myth , and its many
variations , has been the most powerful and dynamic force in American
history:

" ••• myth also contributes to historical change , for people

try to behave in conformity to myth pictures which portray , as Ernst
Cassire says , a dramatic world --

’ the

world of actions , of forces , of

36

conflicting powers. ’

History moves , if it moves at all , in the-·mass ,

and mass psychology is peculiarily dependent on myth. ,, 3 Here Sanford
is speaking of exactly the things which are the subject of this essay:
the self-fulfilling prophecy and behavioral 능 cience as they relate t。
history and historical process.
Sanford ’ s analysis of the role of the edenic myth is , thus , a
detailed study of the manner in which it has moved through time and
space from its origin into the stream of the Am erican life style.

He

demonstrates , by whathe calls the "Journey Pattern of Modern History ,"
how the vision of a heavenly paradise was transformed into an idea of
an earthly view of the

4

future.~

With the discovery of the New World

the medieval mind was finally opened to the possibilities of the fulfillment of the image of a worldly paradis·e which lay some'to1here in the
West.

Columbus , for

ex월nple ，

apparently felt that·the Biblical in-

junction to proclaim the gospel to the ends of the earth would , in
conjunction with the discovery of a "Ne'tY' World’I to the West , fulfill
5

‘

the prophecy of Christ s second coming.lure of paradise in the trade

'tY'

Vespucci too ,

inds off South America. 1I

"... felt the
6
Thus , at

least part of the impetus for exploring and settling the New World
lay in the idea of an image of paradise on earth.
‘

But beyond this

urge to locate earthly paradise in the West lay other considerations
for exploration.

The English , for example , considered themselves ,

II.

divinely appointed to establish themselves in the promised lands of

...7

the New World!'"

F’ollowing the sun in its westward course the Puri-

tans as representatives of just such a "divine appointment ,"
lieved on

삼le

’r ••• be-

whole , that they were the chosen instruments to set up a

~

..‘
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city on the hill ’ as an example of the true Reformation to Europe
and the rest of the world.

In this mission they regarded themselves

as the heirs of all history , curiously unappreciated by Englishmen at
8

home , for whose salvation they prayed."'"
tion of themselves as the

1I

It is this self-characteriza-

heirs of all history" that makes Am ericans

regard their civilization and culture as a chosen one.

The United

States , Sanford contends , embodies more than any other nation , an attempt to realize a perfect Protestant reformation in an earthly para9
dise.
It is this spirit of Pr otestantism which has come to predomi~
nantly characterize Americans:

"Protestants were assuredly not people

to whom things happened , but· people who made things happen , and they
tried to make them happen according to a divine plan operative in his.. 10

tory." -~

This regard for the working of his.torical forces , plus a

much vaunted spirit of individualism based in material wealth , accounts
for much of the success which Americans have had in turning history
(until of late) to their own purposes.
te~ded

to define and shape their

In other words , Am ericans have

own~future

as they saw it.

Sanford

remarks , quite significantly , that as regards the early period of the
Continent ’ s settling , the probability is that ,

"... historians

have un-

derestimated seriously the extent to which millenial fervor molded the
motives of colonists , gave them their objectives , and controlled their
11

conduct."-。f

A~erica，

Sanford seems to contend , was born with a spirit

literal self-determination , yet divinely appointed and to some

eχtent

determined!. The colonists held little doubt that America was to be the

12

site of the second coming.--

But before Christ returned , the earth

was to be paradisically transformed ,

"... as

an outward symbol

38

。f 담던 inward

state. u13

The "race" for

e꽤ire

which continued until

the late 19th century between the New World and the Old ultimately became one of propagating the gospel , converting the heathen , and assigning paradise to earth so as to insure

14

call itself "chosen. I1 - ·

i다

each nation the right

Weinberg , as we have seen in the previous sec-

tion , discusses the proseletyzing spirit of the Amertcan pioneer:
was to be a missionary of Christianity , economics , and freedom.
primary functions of Weinberg ’ s pioneer become in part
aspects of a broader international spirit.
for instance , were as interested

a~

,

’ ~issionary

he
The

for Sanford ,

The Spanish and English ,

the Americans in extending their

concepts of religion and government to the New World. lS
icans in particular ,

t。

But for Amer- -

work on the American frontier con-

tributed greatly to what was tobecome an American superiority complex;
it gave divine sanction to the nineteenth century theme of Manifest
Destiny; and it helped to make Americans great proselytizers allover
the ","orld of the American Way of Life."..16
From the beginning down to

th~

present the emphasis in the United

States has been that Americans are a chosen people who ,

..17
usher ill the final stage of history."·'

"... were

to

American imperialism in the

form of manifest destiny , along with the later 20th century emphasis on
political-military isolation , were both the result of a certain spiritua1 longing.

The former was bornof optimism and the latter from the

disappointments of political realities.

18

Sanford ’ s myth picture and its role extends through all

pha틀 es

of American industrial , political , cultural , and intellectual life.
The myth of the garden seems on the surface , however , missing in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries.

On the contrary , however , the myth

39

continues , albeit in somewhat altered form.
become one of

a'perva~ive

The role of the myth has

expectation of reform and progress:

As a r월 ult of th응j。venant promise , Americans c。 llectiveIy
have 1.5:2뾰 to tak으 J for granted a rich inheritance of inward
and outward life 혹nd have grown accustomed to making extravagant d 밑nands upon a radiant future. This Edenic promise that
made them inveterate reformers , instruments of optimistic fa~
talism~~s well as victims of their own impatience and frustrations .~l9
Thrust into a world position of prominence , Am ericans have attempted to bridge the gap of what had become isolationism to internationa1ism by calling forth her traditional role as moral reformer in a
world of sin.

20

Sanford characterizes this as , ’'the policy of messianic

,, 21
intervention.".......

The policy thereby generated , of reading world poli-

•

tics as a "gigantic conspiracy of satanic forces arrayed against the
.. 22

children of God ,"-- has led Am erica into £.rustration and disappointmente

Its failuretobe consistently victorious , to gain support and

sympathy , .has led , Sanford concludes , to a call for moral regeneration
at the expense of keeping touch with reality.
happening is that Am ericans are
23
been dispossessed from Eden.

c~ing

Wh at may now be finally

to realize that they may have

Sanford ’ s interpretation rests on the dynamic role of myth in
historical causation.

Thus he displays the manner by which a nation

has tried , and in many instances succeeded , in calling an image of the
future into reality.

The myth he speaks of is not , in the final analy-

sis , really myth as such; it is simply a
such myth must be.

vie~

of the future , as any

What Sanford succeeds in doing ,

how~ver ，

is to show

how myths must , in the face of the real world , come to terms with the
possible and with other myth pictures.

~-~

ι

The traditional American

vie찌
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of moral regeneration and spiritual re-birth out of a "European hell"
must finally come to grips with the explosive awakening of a world of
"under-developed" nations , each with their own view of what the future
must hold.

The problem Sanford implicitly raises is one of priorities:

which view of the future is to take precedence over another; the Amer-

’

ican s or the under-developed nations
problem:

’.

This in turn raises a further

’

is it possible for one nation s view of the futureto predom-

inate over all other nations particular pictures?
answered this question in the negative.
sary for

파nericans

Weinberg partially

But Sanford feels it neces-

to review their view in terms of the world we must

live in and with.

Neither writer , however , really comes to close grips

with the problem.

Perhaps the most specific approach to this problem

has been made by Robert L. Heilbroner in The Future as

Historγ.

Heilbroner displays , with rare perspicasity , how Americans have
tended to look upon the future as history.

In other 'tvords how ,

"... we

have approached the future with the sustaining beliefs of a philosophy
。f

optimism.

That is , we have always conceived of the future in terms

of its benignity , its malleability , its compatability with our hopes

24

and desires. ’,-.

This philosophy of optimism is , "at bottom ,

... an

historic attitude toward the future -- an attitude based on the tacit
premise that the future will accommodate the striving we bring to

__ 25

it ••• "

Once again then , we encounter the idea that man is able

project his concept of the future into reality.

t。

Heilbroner finds rea-

son to believe that the day of such conceptual realization has , as far
as national and international. relations , passed.

The past realization

of our national goals , both internal and external , he contends , relied

4 i..'-'
。n

the United States ’sinsulated position in a world of contending and

conflicting ideologies.

Therein lay the secret of America ’ s success

in effecting the transferral of its ideals into reality.
contemporary world , however , the

insul갑강 ion

In the

Qf physical and ideologi-

cal barriershas been stripped away , projecting Am erica directly
the course of world events.

int。

In this uninsulated position the United

States finds its own view of the future in direct competition with
other views.

The rising expectations of the "Third World" countries

have , as a result of our conspicuous display of wealth , been increased
immeasurably.

But the effort to realize these expectations has met with

almost universal disappointment.

Most nations have neither the inher-

ent wealth nor the time to develop what wealth they may posses , nor
the relative freedom from the hegemony of

~n

international system of cor-

porate organization now personified in the United States.

The process

whereby a particular economic view of the future can be realized has
traditionally been for Americans one based upon "capitalism" and "individualism".
eχtension

The basic conflict which faces Am erica is between the

of its economic system , based on wealth and time , on re1a-

tive freedom from international exploitation (which existed in the early
history of the United States) , and the realities of a world which has
neither.

The failure to realize that other countries do not have the

inherent economic background to develop politically along United States
style democratic lines leaves Am erica running against ideological time
and tide.

Heilbroner see·s the world ’ s future tied in with direct na-

tional planning , what we tend 'to call socialism.

Although Heilbroner

does not see the future as inevitably tending in one direction , he

42
does see certain lines of development running counter to traditional

26

American standards.--

more toward p1anned

Thus , the under-developed nations will tend

ec。n?my

and less

t。

t 。。，

free narket enterprise;

as

expectations grow and the realization that many of those same expectations cannot be quickly met , national frustration is likely to set in.
This frustration will likely , as is in somecases now true , be vented
27 ’
and directed against America.-· This means also that Am erica will be
faced with national frustration as other nations display motives and
policies which seemingly run counter to our own.
of China in 1949 this is exactly what happened.

’'McCarthyites"

(After the

I

’fall"

The reaction of the

was the personification of just" such a national frus-

tration.)

What this becomes is nothing less than a clash of national

prophecy:

will the American view of the future prevail or will another

view succeed against it?

It has been noted earlier that when two or

more views of the future come in conflict , the one which shares the
general climate of opinion will likely prevail.
concur when he says:

’'As

a

capital~st

Heilbroner seems

t。

nation we are no longer riding

with the global tides of economic revolution , but against them. ’I

28

,, 29
While Heilbroner sees , "the forces of history closing in""
.7
on

Am erica

,

he does not fall prey to a feeling of inevitability.

For

while the options open to Am erica may have become more restricted ,
they have by no means disappeared.

He says explicitly that ,

are no fixed limits tO'what is historically

p~ssible.

" ... there

Rather , differ-

ent organizations of society define for themselves and the limits
。f

what is and what is not within reach of conscious history-making

30
choice. If ... ..,

Heilbroner appears to believe , with i. n limits , the basic

validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy.

He also suggests another
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facet of the role of myth in historical forces beyond that of which
Sanford writes.
In an article entitled "Myth in the East-West Conflict ,.. 3l John
H. Kautsky raises the direct problem of the rple of myth in shaping
and directing national policy both here and abroad.

In this article ,

which incidentally first led me to the concept of the self-fulfilling
prophecy in history , Kautsky discusses the various labels which lead
to inappropriate symbol transference and usage.
하np1e ，

"Socialist ," for ex-

is , as Kautsky notes , hardly an appropriate term for an African

leader who ,

"... represents

intellectuals aiming at rapid industria1iza-

tionrather than workers aiming at improving their position in an a132
ready industrialized society ••• " .... -

The question of labels , while not

entirely neglected by Heilbroner , is somewhat glossed over.
on the other hand gives it the needed emphasis.

Kautsky

Basing his concept

of myth on George Sorel ’ s definition of myths , as "a complex of remote
goals , tense moral moods and expectations of apolyptic success ,"
Kautsky demonstrates how such concepts as

Marχism，
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Communism , American

democracy , etc. , are all based on industrialized societies whose method
for goal attainment is often irrelevant to the goals of an aspiring
underdeveloped country.

lI

Thus ," writes Kautsky ,

’ ~estern

ideologies ,

which in their own environment can have at least some realistic programatic content , become myths in the Sorelian sense in their new under11 34
developed environment."--

"'T

The real problem is that having become at-

tached to the particular meanings of such concepts as "democracy" and
"socialism" in the context of their own particular situatiQn , people
continue to react to new uses of the terms in old contexts.

Revolu-

44

tionary movements which couch their purpose in terms such as
"democracy" against "tyranny" often at first find ample Western support albeit their true nature is lost on the Western political mind.
Cuba is perhaps the best representative of

th~s

type.

Kautsky goes on to describe how Soviet Marxism is , in its turn ,
ultimately a creation of myth.

He says , concerning this characteriza-

tion ,
What needs to be stressed ••• is ••• that the Marxian categories ,
which are clearly misapplied to the Bolsheviks' actions as explanatory or descriptive concepts , became myths that have affected behavior. The Communists ’ broad program of industrialization as actually followed , especially by Stalin , would quite
probably have been followed by other modernizing re~Qlutionary
intellectuals even if they had never heard of Marx. 35
Similarly , Kautsky examines the effects of myth in foreign relations between the United States and the Soviet Un ion.
Pointing to the realization on Lenin's part that the Soviet revo1ution of 1917 did not , as Marx said it would , take place in an industrial nation , Kautsky traces the genesis of fear andmutual distrust
built up between the United States a~d the Soviet Union over the past
36
50 years.-- Much of this fear , Kautsky concludes , "... has been due to
the mistaken belief on both sides , that it was a revolution appropriate
to an advanced country , a revolution of a proletariat against capital-

,37

ism. ’

The myth of world

c 。따nunist

revolution still of course generates

fear among the political leaders of the "West ," as does fear of capitalist-imperialism among those of the "East."

Gl; owing economic power has

led the Soviet Union to "play down" this latter aspect , so prominent in
its foreign policy when it was weak.

(Due in part , also , to the Amer-

ican intervention in the Russian civil war of

19l9-l920~)

Now that the

~+5

Soviet Union has become strong militarily as well as industrially it can
rely on the more esoteric forms in the fight against "Imperialism."
As Kautsky notes:

lithe realization of World Corrnnunism has been post-

poned to the dim future."
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Kautsky goes on to discuss the implications of symbols as instruments of reassurance and as self-perpetuating

quantiti~s.

What is

important here , hQwever , and what Kautsky does not discuss directly ,
is how myth may ultimately cause war.
simple one:
‘

The pattern is actually a fairly

because of the myths perpetuated by both the United States

and the Soviet Un ion , a mutual

mist~ust

has arisen.

(The actual rea-

sons behind the myths do not matter , -only the result.)

’

fear of the other s intentions.
tary might , and each grows more

'~

Each arms in

’

Each sees the other s growing miliapprehensiv~.

As the armaments grow ,

suspicion that the other wants war and intends to wage it , grows accordingly.

Finally each

eχpeets

finally break into the open.
Union operate on

~uch

war as inevitable , causing it to , of course ,
That the United States and the Soviet

an assumption

~s

clearly the case.

The so-called

military-industrial complex which C. Wright Mills described so perceptively in The Power Elite
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tary-po1itical myth picture.

is the direct result of just such a miliPerhaps no better illustration could be

made to point out the relevancy of the self-fulfilling prophecy in
historical-political- situations.

Ultimately , such prophecy coming

fulfillment could mean the end , not only of
and even of all life itself.

ciγilization，

t。

but of man

Although the future of man is doubtless

important , the understanding of what makes man act in history is , in
the immediate present , far more

r 휩 levant

to civilization.

The future

46

in one sense depends not on
and 브으꽁 it motivates him.

뾰뾰

man may do , but what motivates him

If we do not learn to fully comprehend the

mechanism of historical activity we may never live to contemplate what
a lack of understanding may mean.

CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS
History , we are told , is what has happened.

No one it seems , how-

ever , ever makes it quite clear how the relating of this is to be done.
On the one hand there are Relativistic , Idealistic , Heroic , Dialectic ,
Materialistic , Eschatological , Chiliastic , Positivistic and like
theories of

eχplanation.

On the other there is , for instance , the

sceptic denying our ability to know anything about our past , or the
"ahistoric" individual simply dismissing it all as irrelevant in any
case.

While an "ahistoric" attitude has

~

certain

sinψlicity

which

is appealing it does not seem to satisfy intellectual curiousity (if
such can ever be possible).

But historians are , if not driven to seek

cause in history , fascinated by the prospects such a possibility carries.

History is , at base , probably relevant to man because he is

searching for patterns in the past which will guarantee hisfuture.
George Santayana has said , in a famous quotation , that he who does
not study history is doomed to repeat it.

In so far as man believes

such a statement he believes in progress.

Wh en a problem is no longer

relevant man will no longer
its

elimination~

l~ok

to the past for information

When a belief in progress

~s

conceπling

no longer relevant ,

manwill , in all likelihood , no longer look to history for direction.
While Heilbroner may feel that the very concept of progress is somehow
doomed to decline in importance and perhaps wither away altogether ,
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it is likely that history will continue to maintain a certain relevance
for man.

Heilbroner has said that a philosophy of optimism requires a

certain attitude which may be called almost exclusively Am erican. l

The

prospect arises that only in a progress-oriented society can Neo-synthecism be fully and completely operative.

If society does advance

through history by conscious decisions , then a static culture would
seemingly not be as prone to make decisions about the particular shape
of things to come.

Such a society would perhaps be content to "rest

upon its laurels ," and not consciously choose truly specific courses
。f

action.

In the long run , a nation ’ s political fortunes probably

depend upon great national wealth and an explosive surge of creative
2

and innovative talent to put such wealth to use.would seem to be sufficient.

Alone , neither

Am erica , almost uniquely among modern

nations , has been blessed with both to the extent that it has experienced an incredible technological "jump" unsurpassed in all past time.
The material wealth of the United States has , in part , made it possible
for Americans to believe in a bountiful and beneficent future.
such hope is based for the most part on a beneficent past.

But

There is

thus the concept of progress as an interdependency between the Ureality';’
of what has happened and what the future holds'as possibilities.

If

the past is held as relevant , so will be the future.
Today , however , historical interpretation , if not history itself ,
has become increasingly complex.
no longer suffice.

Simplistic notions of progress will

To understand what has happened in history , his-

torians of the future will be faced with accepting the behavioral sciences as a tool for more complete comprehension.

Perhaps the most
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frustrating mistake historians can make is to view such a complex
creature as man as if he were a simple , easily definable and recognizable quantity. 'History , if it is anything is not simply a record
。f

what has happened , but rather what has happened to

incredibly

compleχ，

핀르프.

As man 、 is

so , too , history is simiiarly complex.

The other

primary mistake of the historian is to approach history as if it were
simply a recording of the events which have transpiredamong men; not
as if it were an intricate , delicately balanced network of human action
and interaction , based on the vagaries of emotion and the web of the
intellect.
tion.

Most historians probably realize the role of interpreta-

What many neglect is an adequate understanding of just what it

is they are interpreting:

man.

To attempt the writing of history in

such circumstance is not unlike trying to predict the path of a ballistic missile without knowing.how such a missile works , or what it is
for.

It can be done , but of what relevance is it if one does not know

what such a missile is meant to do?

It is a case of too little too late.

Few will probablydeny the impqrtant role of the behavioral sciences as an historical tool in some limited degree.

But we must ask ,

what can the behavioral sciences tell us of the outcome of history?
we really , after all , control it directly?

Can

These' are the truly crucial

questions that must be answered; and the answers are not easy ones.
In reality the behavioral sciences can probably , by themselves ,
tell us nothing of the outcome of history.
。f

They can tell us something

the mechanisms ‘ by which history takes place.

The understanding of

mechanisms can in turn lead us to , if not a general picture of the outcome of history , then perhaps more short run and specialized views.
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analogy (dangerous as this form of reasoning may be) may help

illustrate this statement.

t。

Science knows that certain atomic and sub-

atomic particles behave in a certain way under certain conditions.

The

ability to predict what a particle will· do under certain conditions a1wh당 t

lows scientists to predict
will be.

the outcome of say , a chemical reaction ,

On the other hand this predictability is in reality a fairly
To this extent scientists cannot , for exam-

limited kind of activity.

pIe , track a series of particles and make
thro가~houtall

.t·ime.

projectio~s

for their fate

Indeed , if this were possible scientists could

conceivably start from the present , tracing the paths of particles
back through time to their primordial beginnings , then project forward
into the future what
"read-out" a
will

h강ppen

'i펴e

fate of all matter will be.

pre-progr 없med

and when.

Thus they could

pattern of the.universe , telling us what

This would , of course , make everything inevitable.

Several minor difficulties stand in the way of this total comprehension
surpassing mere understanding.

Scientists find themselves , for instance ,

unable to track both the position and velocity of a particle simu1taneously.

This is the famous "Heisenberg Indeterminancy princip1e. ,, 3

At the same time the sheer gargantuan size of such a projection (if it
were possible to do) staggers the intellect.
involved in such a project.

Consider the programming

With one I.B.M. card for each particle and

for each projected path , the number of cards would exceed the total
number of particles'in the known universe!

If cross

sa때 ling ，

that is

statistical sampling , were attempted , the number of possibilities would
make such a sample utterly

me~ningless.

The upshot of all this digres-

sion is that while predictability is applicable in science , it is ap·
plicable only over an exceedingly limited range.
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Similarly , behavioral science , at best in its infancy , can make
only the mostmodest kinds of predictions concerning human behavior.
Nonetheless , the self-fulfilling prophecy , as representative of the
behavioral approach , can make modest historical prediction realizable.
More than anything , Neo-synthecism makes it possible to understand
history as a direct function of human behavior.

It shows how men react

to the subjective features of a situation as if they were objective.
Thus it gives the historian a more complete understanding of the irrational in history.

An d

in one sense , irrationality is to history what

the indeterminancy principle is to physics.

By eXhibiting the process

whereby men concretize the irrational we take into account not so much
the psychology of the act as the direct manifestation.
historian is much like the scientist:
either the position ,

으~

In this the

as the latter can track only

measure the velocity of a particle , so the

historian-behavioral scientist can interpret either the act of irrationality or the psychology of the act.

But ultimately , the hidden

reasons that drive a man to act can only be partially known.

We can-

not go back into time to directly psychoanalyze an historical figure
whQ has

~cted

irrationally; we can only show how he acts in terms of

his reasoning , faulty as it may be.

In this respect , however , the

historian has a slight edge over the scientist for the historian has
a direct , albeit piecemeal , picture of what has happened.

To the ex-

tent he can "see" what has happened he can track simultaneously both
the "position" and "velocity" of an historical figure.

He can thus

directly view irrationality and rationality concretizing itself.

He

has a view from the future which allows him to see how things will turn
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。 ute

While far from complete , the historian can interpret the past in

a much more comprehensive manner than can a physicist attempting t。
account for the genealogy of a particle.

It is , however , in the opera-

tions involving the future , that the historian loses interpretive ground
to the physicist.

F’。r the latter can make predictions based on what

appear to be the highly rational workings of nature , using his own
l

’present" as

~ stable base , while the former is forced to deal with

the more obviously irrational forces of man's intel1~ct，、 with little
apparent bases for understanding.

In other words , there is a fine

line dividing our understanding of the concrete and relatively obvious
pa$t human event from

thξ

not so obvious sub-atoli'\ic

~\，.，힘'\ t

•

13 \l t

regard to the future the reverse becomes true , and man becomes
supposedly totally uru<no\vu factor.

'(,T

H: h

thε

At present , particle physics can-

not help man understand the minute interactions and relations which
make him function but , perhaps , the future of
possibility.

당 cienee

holds out this

Wh ere science has made contemporary strides more directly

applicable is , as we have seen , in behavioral science.
Can we then come to directly control the future and dictate the
。 utcome?

America in the Sixties is a troubled land , troubled by racial

conflict , by political assassinations and by foreign difficulties ,
among other things.
can history:

One thing has become clear in contemporary Am eri-

we are desperately trying to come to grips with the pos-

sibi1ities of our future.

Am erica can probably go in many directions ,

4
but it can no longer afford to simply "drift."'"

Its people , its cit-

ies , its enemies. will not allow the United States to pursue a course
dictated by non-involvement.

Most Americans are fully aware of the
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implications of a policy , both external and internal , which does.. not
direct.

Thenew politics of Left , Center , and Right reflect a defAm erica then , is try-

inite sense of direction for good or for evil.
~ng

to direct

it~

mm history.

(Some critics ‘ of the Am erican scene

would probably go as far as to say that we ;:.:;:e trying to direct the
history of everyone!)
The United States , as well as much· of the rest of the world , has
learned some unique and increasingly important lessons over the past
t~ree

decades.

The implications of what we have learned are fraught

with promise and incredible disaster for man ln general.

One of these

important lessons is this:
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hower said ,

while it may be correct as President Eisen5
that men ’ s hearts cannot be legislated to , it is not only
r

tain forms of behaVior , certain other "negative’I aspects of behavior
can be altered.

.Thus while men may feel no differently in their hearts ,

their actions can be suited to purposes beyond them.
implicitly recognizes this fact

when~it

Every society

makes its laws.

What this comes

down to is but another form of the self-fulfilling prophecy.A society
can thus concretize a legal fiction.
and shape beliefs.

0마

This in turn can ultimately alter

society is consciously doing just this in rela-

tion to the contemporary racial situation.

It is trying to shape and

direct how , in a fairly precise way , America will look in the future.
The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 , 1957 , 1960 , and.1964 , are all attempts
to.do just this.

We are then , in the very process ofdefining our fu-

ture as'we would will it.

Martin Luther King , Jr. in 1962 , demonstrated

and outlined just what is currently taking place in America and how it
is happening:
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,

There are always those who will argue that legislation , court
orders and executive decrees from the Federal 낀 Jvernment are ineffective because they cannot legislate morals. But while it
may be true that morality cannot be legislated , behavior can be
regulated. The law may not change the heart -- but it can restrain the heartless. It will take education and religion t。
change bad internal attitudes -- but legislation and court
orders can control their external effects. Federal court decrees have , for example , altered transportation patterns and
changed social mores -- so that the habits , if not the heart갑’
of people 르E르 being altered every day by Federal action. And
these major social changes have a cumulative force conditioning
other segments of life. o
‘

By legislating

효으

men , governments attempt to fulfill not only a proph-

ecy of future stability but the shape of society in general , according
to certain preconceived ideas.
amount of planning.

No society can exist without a certain

This process faces several problems , however , deal-

ing directly with the self-fulfilling prophecy.

First , as Merton points

out:
an extensive and as yet imperfeε쉰 ly identified type of
social science prediction is confron亡 ed with a paradox: if it
is made public , the prediction becomes seemingly invalidated
and if it is not made public it is g~nerally regarded as postdiction. It is considered knowledge after the fact.7
As social scientists have come to recognize , a prediction , or prophecy ,
can invalidate itself once the terms come to be fully recognized.

Mer-

ton illustrates this by pointing , outthat a
• government economist ’ s distant forecase of an oversupply of wheat may possibly lead individual producers of wheat t 。
so cu~tail their planned production as to invalidate the forecast. U
Thus , too , as the intent of civil rights legislation comes to be generally known , it can be invalidated by direct resistance , as in the case
。f

militants of either race.

This kind of process is called the "self9

destroying belief" by Merton.'

It points up the problem of defining

and identifying conscious and unconscious prophecy within society.

By

•
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.directly identifying andexhibiting such beliefs the social scientist
and historian run the risk of negating their discoveries concerning the
future of a given society.

This problem, however , is of relatively

little importance in view of the other major problem social prediction
If , as C. Wright Mills contends there is a military , political ,

implies.

and industrial elite which is shaping and guiding American policy here
and

10

abroad，~~

the possibility for direct.social control by a relatively

few men certainly exists.

Governmental legislation could be aimed at

direct population control by extremely subtle and sophisticated means.
Thus , a legislative effort could be made directing its attention at
unifying white and black in America not simply because it is "right ,"
but because it splidifies the political control of the larger white
majority.

While such activity could only be subtly directed in Am erica ,
,

its studied application in China , for example , is hardly subtle.
,

It

would seem in the latter case that social stability was being maintained
in part by projecting a view of the future which sees a ’ 'jihad" , or "holy
war" , with either the United States 0;- the Soviet Union as possible ,
if not inevitable.

The point is that a view of the future can have

very negative implications for control as well as general outcome.

The

elements of planning for the future , so necessary for society , can be
twisted to uses beyond the individual citizen to the advantage of a
single group or political figure.

George Orwell ’ s 설옆 is the perfect

picture of what a society can read into its
may be.

Recognition of the problem can

fu~ure，

obvio\펴 ly

horrifying as it

help to allay the

sibilities of such a prospect by realizing new socially beneficent
and sound policy.

Neo-synthecism then , can help as a tool for the

p 。야s-
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‘

interpretation of the historical past and the probable historical
future; to create and most importantly discover and analyze those
functionswhich society takes for granted -- those functions which
society implicitly recognizes but often does

~ot

speak

αf

consciously.

Neo-synthecism is more than a way of looking at history -- ultimately it is a way of describing all the interlocking activities of
man ,.
。ne

It is thus , possible to look upon it as an activity transcending
or two disciplines for an interdisciplinary approach to the ultimate

goal of all human activity:
to the universe.

the understanding of man and his relation

Neo-synthecism while not ans 'tvering the "why" of things

in a metaphysical manner , can certainly aim at an explanation in terms
‘

of the physical reality of human nature.

I do not mean to denigrate

the role of the spiritual in the explanation of human events; this must ,
however , take its place in the non-empirical side of human affairs.

It

must , therefore , be taken into account , but not as a total explanation.
It is but one facet of human activity and , like the irrational , has its
own reasons , and must , therefore ,

be~accounted

for.

Each man finds his own time the most difficult , the most dangerous ,
and the most intriguing in history.

The perspectives so necessary to a

master of oneself and ones times and environment are not easily'won by
any generation.

Some succeed , others fail miserably.

Each genera-

tion tries its best to cope with the world as it finds it.

No genera-

tion has ever made the world they inherited; each generation changes
the world it finds itself swept into.

Events can probably control

men -- but men can , if they will but try , control events.
if it teaches us anything teaches us this fact.

History ,

There is a point man
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must come to in dealing with history and

칩1e

cur:-ents of contemporary

events when he will·have to take responsibility for his activity.
rationality can be no excuse for the course of
sponsible for that very irrationality.

events~

Ir-

for man is re-

We hav e. seen ,· in a limited way ,

the manner in which historians and social scientists have come to realize the proper role of man in history.

Some , the behavioral scientists

for example , exhibit this role explicitly.

Historians utilize this gen-

eralization , but often unwittingly.
Americans are generally 낀 aid to be committed to the idea of pro-

gress and individualism.

What they really have been committed to is

action in the pursuit.of a particular future.

The time has come for a

fuller understanding of the process whereby men make history come
pass.

It will

b앙

a difficult endeavor , for in observing and recording
Too , we must take into considera-

we may alter the outcome we expect.
tion the nature of change itself.·
never be able to take into account.
years ago the

!.렬죠

t。

The강 e

are obviously factors we shall

Who would have accepted one-hundred

possibilities of a

썩yage

around the moon?

Even now

the voyages being made into space take on an almost unreal quality.

But

while it is impossible to account for specific change it is not impossible to be prepared for it.

In terms of the historical process , both

past and future , the Neo-synthetic theory allows for non-absolute continuity , while providing "relative" and conditional continuity.

What

this means is that the unexpected need not destroy the efficacy of Neosynthecism.

r’。r

instance , the past seems static and unchanging to the

observer looking "back."

Occasionally , however , this static condition

reveals a certain unexpected dynamism when a new ’'fact" comes to light
and changes an entire historical perspective.
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j

Charles A. Beard ’ s An Economic I Th terpretation of the Constitution
11
is a case in point. -changes.

Suddenly new vistas open up and the past somehow

While some people are upset , most exhibit a certain curiousity.

But when an expected future event , such as was the case with democracy
in Cuba , does not come to pass most people are either very upset or at
least must change some of their plans.
very disquieting.

Unfulfilled

eχpectations

can be

If we do succeed in making predictions , or at very

least , discovering implicit prophecy within

society~

its non-fulfillment

would seem to destroy the predictive capabilities of Neo-synthecism.

But

if we keep in mind the limits and ranges of our activities in the same
manner as a nuclear physicist does , we can allow for sudden and dramatic
change.
t~st ，

Such change need not upset the historian or behavioral scien-

but rather serve to remind him that

is indicated and must be accounted for.

~

turn in the road of time

As the title of this essay

suggests , it is necessary for the historian to not only look back upon
the past from the perspective of the moment , but to also "look back" from
the future , in terms of its
of the present.

possibi~ities，

to discover the real meaning

One must have , in this sense , a "view from the future."

History is a discipline that must be approached delicately and
ively , for so much of it is interpretive.

An d ,

pe~cept-

as Paul Ricoeur·has

said , "If we want to be instructed by events , then we must not be in
a hurry to solve them."12
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APPENDIX
There are some relatively obvious connections that can be made
between the self-fulfilling prophecy , revolutionary Marxism and revoluAs has been noted , every true revolutionary

tionaries in general.

utilizes the self-fulfilling prophecy.

Revolutionary Marxism , in its

19th century orientation toward the evils of industrialism , called for
upheaval in those countries which were marked by a high degree of technological , that is industrial , advancement •. The standard· criticism
raised against

tho~e

so-called "Marxist revolutions" that did take

place (e.g. , Russia and China) is that nowhere has the ideology flourished where there was an advanced technological

I

state.~

In one sense

this is a rather damning pronouncement concerning the true nature of
Marχism.
fals~

On the other hand , it shows , once again , how an originally

definition of a situation evokes neW behavior; thus fulfilling

the terms of the originally false definition.
The Communist State is a definition of a political situation that
has never really come to pass.

Yet the revolutionaries in preindustrial

China and Russia , initiated and carried through their respective revolutions as if they were based upon the original Marxian economic and
political conditions.

To강 ay

both Russia and China still continue

to define their world and social roles as Marxian.

Th e peculiarly

false situations , which both derive their "Marxian' ’ beginnings from
are really unimportant in-so-far as this essay is concerned.
civilizations live on

I

’selected

All

fictions" which men call "ideals."

That
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such "ideals" are in the main , ’'fictious" does not , however , make them
superfluous or \vithout value.

Indeed , as Soviet and Chinese "Marxism"

makes apparent , such definitions , whether or not they are attained in
the ideal , are dynamic and emotion-filled mQdes.
tainly , that

Marχism

No one denies , cer-

and Capitalism are "loaded" words , and if one in-

quires as to why they are "loaded" then he must come to grips vlith the
way men define themselves and their world.

But this means more than

simply understanding a philosophy or philosophies.

Ultimately it

means understanding how men approach their future with regard to the
world and themselves.

For if a man cannot picture a philosophy , 'a

social world , or a political structure as fully able of beingrealized
,

in the real world (and in some not too distant future) then he will
not act upon that vision.

It is in the end , an almost too simple recog-

nition of what every human being does in his own daily life.

Each of

us expects to live for a certain amount of time; and each of us to a
certain extent fills in that "projected time" with certain plans.
this not really making prophecy

abo~t

ourselves?

Is

We certainly have no

guarantee of the future , yet we all expect certain things.

What the

revolutionary does is simply adopt to a more definitive view of the
future.

The Marxists , as representative of the revolutionary , assumes

a surpassing mastery over fate because he claims to know the pattern
of history , and the inevitable.

Everything he does will , as such ,

be defined and delineated in terms of this assumption.

Even when events

transpire differently the revolutionary Marxist will probably interpret
them as part of the process of the dynamics of history.
his strength.· Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Chinese

Herein lies

Peoplε’ s

Republic
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for example , apparently viewed many of the setbacks to the eventual
revolutionary victory of 1949 as almost necessary:
process

of 、 the

dialectic.

2

as fulfilling the

Action and reaction then are defined by

the , manner in which an individual approaches the future.

Things may ,

of course , "pile up" and simply make all definitions of a

partiιular

future irrelevant.

The revolutionary Marxist may finally encounter

much to cope with and be submerged in the currents of history.

to。

Men (as

in the case of Regis Debray and "Che" Guevara)3 who consider man master
of his own fate , may misread and misdirect the conduct and course of affairs.

Sometimes even a million men cannot move one idea.
Man , as a whole , is certainly aware of the role of political and

philosophical activity as a motivating factor in the affairs of nations
and individuals.

tvhat may be lost on many is the role that expectations

(i.e. , prophecy) have in relation to motivation.
French

I

Merleau Ponty , the

’political" philosopher has said , "Ellel확 Politiq1.표jn ’ est pas

une chapitre d ’ une histoire universelle deja ecrite.
/

qui s ’ invente. ’.4

Elle est une'action

One might add , howeyer , that while there is no' lI histoire
-

universelle deja ecrite" , there are "invented" pictures of possible
/

futures which as prophecy , tend , through the activity of men , to realize themselves.

In other words , the only views of the future that

will come to pass as "already written" are those that man insures through
the acts of his own will; Marxist ’ s not excepted.
tionnaires • • •

,"

"Le s

grands revolu-

writes Merleau Ponty , "savent bien que 1 ’ histoire

universelle n'est pas ~ contempler , mais 'faire. • • ."
/

-'---•--•--•

